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Initiated as funding legislation in 1975 and amended periodical 
reauthorizations,1 the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA)2 provides a detailed framework of procedural requirements 
focused on the obligation of providing a “free appropriate public 
education” (FAPE)3 to each student with a disability.4  These 
procedural requirements include, for example, the FAPE delivery 
vehicle of an individualized education program (IEP),5 the 
administrative adjudicatory dispute resolution mechanism of an 
impartial due process hearing,6 and specialized notices for various 
stages of this process.7 
In the landmark case Board of Education v. Rowley in 1982,8 the 
Supreme Court concluded that FAPE has two prongs—procedural 
compliance and a less specific substantive standard.9  In the 
succeeding decades, the courts have gradually eroded the procedural 
dimension to the point of near distinction by giving preemptive effect 
to the substantive dimension.10   
                                                     
* Perry A. Zirkel is University Professor Emeritus of Education and Law at 
Lehigh University.  He acknowledges with appreciation the review of this 
manuscript by Ann Vevier Lockwood, who is a long-time and well-respected 
hearing officer in Texas. 
1 The successive reauthorizations included the 1986 amendments, Education of 
the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99 § 457, 100 Stat. 1145 
(1986) (amended 1990), which included attorneys’ fees for prevailing parents; the 
1990 amendments, Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. 
L. No. 101 § 476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990) (amended 1991), which provided, inter 
alia, the IDEA as the new name for the original Education of the Handicapped Act; 
the 1997 amendments, Individuals with Disabilities Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. 
L. No. 105 § 17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) (amended 2004), which included major 
provisions for discipline of students with disabilities; and the most recent 2004 
amendments, Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 
Pub. L. No. 108, § 446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004), which included fine-tuning several 
provisions of the Act.  For historical perspectives, see Edward W. Martin, Reed 
Martin, & Donna L. Terman, The Legislative and Litigation History of Special 
Education, 6 FUTURE OF CHILD. 25 (1996); Mitchell Yell, David Rogers, & 
Elisabeth Lodge Rogers, The Legal History of Special Education, 19 REMEDIAL & 
SPECIAL EDUC. 219 (1998). 
2 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–19 (2017). 
3 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2017).  E.g., Sytsema v. Acad. Sch. Dist. No. 20, 538 
F.3d 1306, 1312 (10th Cir. 2008) (characterized FAPE as “the central pillar of the 
IDEA statutory structure”). 
4 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(3), 1412(a)(1)(A) (2017). 
5 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(14), 1414(d) (2017).  E.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 
311 (1988) (characterizing the IEP as “the primary vehicle” of the IDEA). 
6 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)–(i) (2017). 
7 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)–(d) (2017). 
8 Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley (Rowley), 458 
U.S. 176 (1982). 
9 Id. at 182, 187–91.  
10 See M.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cty, 303 F.3d 523, 533 
(4th Cir. 2002) (“When such a procedural defect exists, we are obliged to assess 
whether it resulted in the loss of an educational opportunity for the disabled 
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The article’s purpose is to stimulate IDEA adjudicators, starting 
with the specialized and significant level of impartial hearing 
officers,11 and to restore the enforceable meaning of the procedural 
requirements of the IDEA.  Doing so will provide a more coherent 
balance with not only the substantive dimension, but also the other 
decisional dispute resolution mechanisms of the Act.12  Part I 
provides an overview of the procedural structure of the IDEA and the 
Supreme Court’s framework interpretation.13  Part II traces the 
subsequent interpretation of the procedural dimension of FAPE, 
culminating in the codification of the two-part test in the latest IDEA 
amendments.14  Part III proposes an adjudicative approach for 
enforcing the procedural dimension of FAPE.15 
 
I.  PROCEDURAL DIMENSIONS OF FAPE 
 
The IDEA regulation’s requirements supplement the IDEA 
legislation,16 which consists of approximately fifty pages specific to 
public schools.17  The detailed procedural provisions extend from the 
state to the local level.18  In an analysis of part of the procedural 
                                                     
child”); Sch. Bd. of Collier Cty. v. K.C. ex rel. SWC, 285 F.3d 977, 982 (11th Cir. 
2002) (reciting the test for a “procedurally defective IEP” as whether it “failed to 
provide [the child] with any educational benefit”); T.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 54, 
265 F.3d 1090, 1093 n.2 (10th Cir. 2001) (“If there has been no substantive 
deprivation, procedural defects do not amount to a denial of FAPE”). 
11 E.g., Burilovich v. Bd. of Educ. of Lincoln Consol. Sch., 208 F.3d 560, 566–
67 (6th Cir. 2000) (recognizing the specialized expertise of IDEA hearing officers 
as compared to the federal judiciary); Perry A. Zirkel & Cathy Skidmore, Judicial 
Appeal of Due Process Hearing Rulings: The Extent and Direction of Decisional 
Change, 29 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 22 (2017) (finding that in almost three 
quarters of the cases the final court decision upheld the hearing officer’s rulings 
with slight or no change). 
12 E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, A Comparison of the IDEA’s Dispute Resolution 
Processes—Complaint Procedures and Impartial Hearings: An Update, 369 EDUC. 
L. REP. 550 (2019) (providing a detailed comparison of the administrative 
adjudicative mechanism of the IDEA, the impartial hearing, with its corresponding 
administrative investigative avenue, the complaint procedures mechanism under 34 
C.F.R. §§ 300.151–300.15 (2018); Perry A. Zirkel, The Two Decisional Processes 
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: An Empirical Comparison, 
16 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 169 (2017) (An Empirical Comparison) (providing a 
comparative analysis of the frequency and outcomes of issue rulings under the 
impartial hearing and complaint procedures avenues of the IDEA).  
13 See infra Part I.  
14 See infra Part II.  
15 See infra Part II.  
16 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1(a)–(d) (2018). 
17 20 U.S.C §§ 1400–1419 (2017).  These sections are Part B, which applies to 
eligible children ages three to twenty-one, but the statute is even longer in its 
entirety, extending to 20 U.S.C. § 1482 (2017). 
18 34 C.F.R. § 300.1(c) (2018) (stating “[t]o assist States, localities, educational 
agencies, and Federal agencies to provide for the education of all children with 
disabilities”). 
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dimension of the IDEA at the local level,19 Zirkel and Hetrick 
identified at least four major and various miscellaneous school district 
requirements for each of these core FAPE categories: (1) IEP 
components, (2) IEP team, and (3) IEP development, revision, and 
effectuation.20 
The Supreme Court in its aforementioned21 landmark Rowley 
decision recognized the separable importance of the Act’s procedural 
framework in delineating the meaning of FAPE under the IDEA.22  
Specifically, the Court placed at least equal emphasis on procedural 
compliance as substantive quality in its foundational reasoning:  
When the elaborate and highly specific procedural safeguards . . . 
are contrasted with the general and somewhat imprecise substantive 
admonitions contained in the Act, we think that the importance 
Congress attached to these procedural safeguards cannot be gainsaid.  
It seems to us no exaggeration to say that Congress placed every bit 
as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures . . . as it did 
upon the measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive 
standard.  We . . . [infer] the legislative conviction that adequate 
compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases 
assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of 
substantive content in an IEP.23 
The Court reasoned that the detailed procedural provisions would 
open the door to the requisite education24 and interpreted the Act’s 
vague FAPE definition to provide only a rather low floor once 
inside.25  As a result, the Court divined a two-pronged standard, with 
apparent primacy and stringency on the first dimension.  Specifically, 
to determine compliance with the standard, the Court set forth these 
adjudicative questions:  “[f]irst, has the State complied with the 
procedures set forth in the Act?  And second, is the individualized 
                                                     
19 This compilation did not extend to the procedural requirements at the school 
district level for child find (34 C.F.R. § 300.111 (2018)) and eligibility (34 C.F.R. 
§§ 300.306–300.311 (2018)); least restrictive environment (34 C.F.R. §§ 300.114–
300.116 (2018)); parental consent (34 C.F.R. §§ 300.300 (2018)); discipline (34 
C.F.R. §§ 300.530–300.536 (2018)); parentally placed private school children (34 
C.F.R. §§ 300.131–300.140 (2018)); interagency cooperation (34 C.F.R. § 300.154 
(2018)); the dispute resolution processes (34 C.F.R §§ 300.151–300.153; 300.506–
300.515 (2018)) and remedies (34 C.F.R. § 300.148 (2018)). 
20 Perry A. Zirkel & Allyse Hetrick, Which Procedural Parts of the IDEA Are 
the Most Judicially Vulnerable? 83 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 219, 224 (2017). 
21 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205–08.  
22 Id.  
23 Id. 205–06. 
24 Id. at 192. “[T]he intent of the Act was more to open the door of public 
education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee any 
particular level of education once inside.”  Id.  
25 Id. at 201. “[T]he ‘basic floor of opportunity’ provided by the Act consists of 
access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually 
designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child.”  Id.  
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educational program developed through the Act's procedures 
reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational 
benefits?”26  
 
II.  THE SUBSEQUENT INTERPRETATION OF THE PROCEDURAL 
DIMENSION 
 
The post-Rowley interpretations of the procedural prong extended 
both vertically in chronological phases and horizontally in subject 
matter scope.27  The phases were before and after the 2004 IDEA 
amendments28 whereas the scope started with the core meaning of 
FAPE and extended to the full range of procedural issues, including 
child find.29  
 
A. Pre-2004 Judicial Interpretations 
 
Rather than strict application, the Rowley progeny gradually 
developed a harmless error approach to procedural FAPE largely 
culminating in the application of the relatively relaxed substantive 
standard.30  Initially, a few jurisdictions stopped at the determination 
of whether the school district violated one or more of the procedural 
requirements of the IDEA, thus amounting to a per se approach.31  
Eventually, however, the prevailing approach added a second step for 
cases in which the court determined that there was a violation.32  In 
the majority of these Rowley progeny cases, the question for the 
second step was whether the procedural violation resulted in a 
substantive loss to the student,33 thus having the effect of Rowley’s 
                                                     
26 Id. at 206–07.  
27 See generally Perry A. Zirkel, Is it Time for Elevating the Standard for FAPE 
under IDEA?, 79 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 497 (2013) (Elevating the Standard for 
FAPE); Stacy Inman & Darren Bogie, Child Find How to Find the Children Before 
the Parents Find You, SCH. LEGAL SERV. 1 (2015), 
http://schoolslegalservice.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2016/02/B-Child-Find-
SLI.pdf. 
28 See generally Elevating the Standard for FAPE, supra note 27. 
29 E.g., Bd. of Educ. of Fayette Cty. v. L.M., 478 F.3d 307, 313 (6th Cir. 2007); 
D.K. ex rel. Stephen K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 249 (3d Cir 2012).   
30 Perry A. Zirkel, Adjudicative Remedies for Denials of FAPE, 33 J. NAT’L 
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 215, 237 (2013).  
31 E.g., Jon Romberg, The Means Justify the Ends: Structural Due Process in 
Special Education Law, 48 HARV. J. LEG. 415, 435–37 (2011) (canvassing the 
initial chaotic variety of approaches but, via a case study of the Fourth Circuit, 
showing the movement from the per se to the majority approach of requiring a 
substantive loss to the student as the second step). 
32 See id.   
33 E.g., MM ex rel. DM, 303 F.3d at 533 (“When such a procedural defect 
exists, we are obliged to assess whether it resulted in the loss of an educational 
opportunity for the disabled child”); Sch. Bd. of Collier Cty., 285 F.3d at 982 
(reciting the test for a “procedurally defective IEP” as whether it “failed to provide 
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second prong swallowing its first, procedural prong.34  In a minority 
of the cases, the courts applied the alternative step two of a loss to the 
student’s parents.35   
 
B. IDEA 2004 Codification 
 
Although the specific contours of the second step were consistent 
in this substantial body of post-Rowley procedural FAPE case law,36 
the 2004 IDEA amendments adopted the two-step harmless error 
approach as follows: 
  
 In matters alleging a procedural violation, a hearing 
 officer  may find that a child did not receive a . . . 
 [FAPE] only if the procedural inadequacies–(I) 
 impeded the child's right to a . . . [FAPE]; (II) 
 significantly impeded the parent's opportunity to 
 participate in the decision-making [sic] process 
 regarding the  provision of a . . . [FAPE] to the parents’ 
 child; or (III) caused  a deprivation of educational 
 benefits.37 
 
                                                     
[the child] with any educational benefit”); T.S., 265 F.3d at 1093 n.2 (“If there has 
been no substantive deprivation, procedural defects do not amount to a denial of 
FAPE”). 
34 See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206–07 and accompanying text for two-pronged 
test. 
35 E.g., Adam J. ex rel. Robert J. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 328 F.3d 804, 812 
(5th Cir. 2003) (“[whether the] procedural deficiency resulted in a loss of 
educational opportunity or infringed his parents' opportunity to participate in the 
IEP process”); W.G. ex rel. R.G. v. Bd. of Tr. of Target Range Sch. Dist., 960 F.2d 
1479, 1484 (9th Cir. 1992) (“procedural inadequacies that result in the loss of 
educational opportunity . . . or seriously infringe the parents' opportunity to 
participate in the IEP formulation process).  Although courts have similarly not 
been clear or consistent in differentiating substantive and procedural rights, it would 
appear that this parental right is mixed but ultimately substantive.  E.g., Winkelman 
v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 533 (2007) (“We conclude IDEA grants 
parents independent, enforceable rights.  These rights, which are not limited to 
certain procedural and reimbursement-related matters, encompass the entitlement to 
a free appropriate public education for the parents' child”). 
36 E.g., Romberg, supra note 31, at 429–30 (concluding, under the rubric of 
“judicial chaos,” that the Rowley progeny “often referred to the Supreme Court’s 
insistence on the primary importance of the IDEA’s procedural protections, but 
were at a loss when attempting to figure out what those protections actually 
meant”); Perry A. Zirkel, Parental Participation: The Paramount Procedural 
Requirement under the IDEA?, 15 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 1, 5–11 (2016) (Parental 
Participation) (using the wavering line of Ninth Circuit decisions illustrates the lack 
of clarity and consistency). 
37 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii) (2017).  Because the first prong appears to 
serve only as a general introduction, the second and third prongs amount to the 
alternative requisite losses to the child or the parents. 
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As Romberg observed, an adjudicative interpretation of this 
codification as making the procedural protections of the Act 
superfluous would be “misguided.”38  But, what has been the 
prevailing adjudicative treatment and what should it be? 
 
C. Post-2004 Judicial Interpretation 
 
Illustrating the effect of this IDEA 2004 provision, a systematic 
analysis of a representative sample of the IEP related procedural 
FAPE court decisions revealed that most of these claims were 
unsuccessful.39  More specifically, upon the courts’ application of the 
two-step test, the outcome was conclusively in the plaintiffs’ favor in 
only 18% of the claims.40  Even though the parents asserted an 
average of two procedural violations per case, they fared almost as 
poorly upon reanalyzing the case outcomes on a best-for-plaintiff 
basis.41  Similarly, a procedural claims analysis of parental 
participation at steps one and two from 2007 to 2015 found that the 
plaintiffs fared poorly and in almost half of the cases the court failed 
to cite the applicable statutory standard.42 
Although special education experts regard the IEP’s specialized 
components as proactive and substantive,43 findings suggest that 
many courts consider them procedural and, thus, subject to the 
relaxed two-step analysis.44  For example, an analysis of the judicial 
rulings specific to transition services, which the IDEA requires for 
bridging to post-secondary education or employment,45 found that the 
outcomes were largely in favor of districts, often based on the two-
                                                     
38 Romberg, supra note 31, at 440–41.  However, his assertion that the previous 
scholarly commentary adopted this interpretation seems to be an overstatement.    
39 Zirkel & Hetrick, supra note 20, at 225–26. 
40 Id. at 225. 
41 Specifically, on a case-by-case rather than claim-by-claim basis, courts ruled 
conclusively in favor of the plaintiff-parents in 25% of the cases, with an additional 
4% being inconclusive (i.e., subject to further proceedings).  Id. at 226. 
42 Parental Participation, supra note 36, at 19–20.  If hearing officers and 
courts more robustly applied this alternative statutory standard for the requisite loss 
for denial of FAPE, the need for the proposed solution would not be so acutely 
broad-based. 
43 See generally Julie J. Weatherly, IEP Disasters: Common Procedural and 
Substantive Mistakes to Avoid, Nebraska/Kansas Regional Special Education 
Conference (Nov. 7, 2008) in Julie J. Weatherly, IEP Disasters: Common 
Procedural and Substantive Mistakes to Avoid, THERASHARE 1, 14, 19 (2008), 
http://www.therashare.net/files/KSDEIEPDisasters.pdf (characterizing measurable 
goals and transition services as substantive). 
44 E.g., M.C. ex rel. M.N. v. Antelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 
1189, 1194–1201 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Elevating the Standard for FAPE, supra 
note 27, at 500. 
45 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(I)(VIII) (2017). 
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step procedural approach.46  Under this approach, most courts applied 
step two globally to the IEP rather than specifically to the transition 
component, eviscerating the statutory compliance specifications for 
transition services.47  A more dramatic example is the judiciary’s 
treatment of the IDEA’s seemingly proactive provisions and corollary 
state special education laws for functional behavioral assessments 
(FBAs) and behavior intervention plans (BIPs).48  Successive 
empirical analyses revealed an increasingly pro-district skew in FBA 
and BIP rulings, with the two-step approach being predominant.49  In 
the most recent six-year period, the judicial outcomes favored the 
districts 7:1, and the rulings in New York, which has the strongest 
FBA-BIP law, were not significantly more parent favorable.50 
                                                     
46 Perry A. Zirkel, An Analysis of the Judicial Rulings for Transition Services 
under the IDEA, 41 CAREER DEV. & TRANSITION FOR EXCEPTIONAL INDIVIDUALS 
136 (2018).  The overall outcomes ratio of the rulings was 3:1 in favor of districts, 
with this pro-district skew particularly pronounced for the federal appellate courts 
and in the most recent segment of the sixteen-year period.  Id. at 141. 
47 Id. at 141–42 (citing also the limited exception of Gibson v. Forest Hills Sch. 
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 655 F. App’x 423 (6th Cir. 2016)). 
48 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(I) (2017) (implicit special consideration in the 
IEP); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(ii); 20 U.S.C.§ 1415(k)(1)(F)(i) (explicit 
requirement for disciplinary changes in placement).  For the corollary state laws, 
see Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws for Functional Behavioral Assessments and 
Behavior Intervention Plans: An Update, 45 COMMUNIQUÉ 4 (Nov. 2016); Perry 
Zirkel, State Special Education Laws for Functional Behavioral Assessments and 
Behavior Intervention Plans, 36 BEHAV. DISORDERS 262 (2011). 
49 Perry A. Zirkel, An Update of Judicial Rulings Specific to FBAs or BIPs 
under the IDEA and Corollary State Laws, 51 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 50 (2017) (Judicial 
Rulings Specific to FBAs or BIPs); Perry A. Zirkel, Case Law for Functional 
Behavioral Assessments and Behavior Intervention Plans: An Empirical Analysis, 
35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 133 (2011). 
50 Judicial Rulings Specific to FBAs or BIPs, supra note 49, at 53–54. 
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Moreover, courts extended this largely fatal two-step approach to 
the fuller gamut of procedural claims, 51  even to violations of the 
procedural requirements for impartial hearing decisions.52  The most 
glaring examples are child find53 claims because they are at the root of 
the entire identification and FAPE process, being directly before a 
child’s eligibility determination.54  A growing line of court decisions 
have concluded that if a district violates its child find obligation but the 
record lacks an ultimate determination that the child is eligible under 
the Act, the parent is without any remedy, effectively including 55 
attorneys’ fees.56   
This adjudicative conclusion eviscerates the child find duty in the 
                                                     
51 See supra note 19 for the fuller range beyond the IEP process. 
52 E.g., Pangerl v. Peoria Unified Sch. Dist., 780 F. App’x 505, 507 (9th Cir. 
2019); J.D. ex rel. J.D.  v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60, 69–70 (2d Cir. 2000); 
Heather S. ex rel. Kathy S. v. Wisconsin, 125 F.3d 1045, 1059–60 (7th Cir. 1997); 
Amman v. Stow Sch. Sys., 982 F.2d 644, 653 (1st Cir. 1993). 
53 Courts have interpreted the IDEA’s child find provision, 20 U.S.C. § 
1412(a)(3) (2017), as referring to school districts’ ongoing affirmative obligation to 
evaluate a child after reasonably suspecting that the child may be eligible under the 
Act.  E.g., W.A. ex rel. W.E. v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 126 
(2d Cir. 2019); Krawietz v. Galveston Indep. Sch. Dist., 900 F.3d 673 (5th Cir. 
2018); Mr. P v. W. Hartford Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 735 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 322 (2018); M.G. v. Williamson Cty. Sch., 720 F. App’x 280 
(6th Cir. 2018); D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2012).  For 
illustrative overviews, see Perry A. Zirkel, An Adjudicative Checklist for Child Find 
and Eligibility under the IDEA, 357 EDUC. L. REP. 30 (2018); Perry A. Zirkel, 
“Child Find”: The Lore v. the Law, 307 EDUC. L. REP. 574 (2014). 
54 Moreover, child find is not the only area of the IDEA’s procedural 
requirements that is beyond the technical scope of the child’s eligibility.  Other 
examples include the disciplinary protections for “students not yet eligible for 
special education” what is commonly referred to as the “response to intervention” 
(RTI) provision for identification of students with learning disabilities and the 
requirements for evaluations more generally.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5) (2017); 20 
U.S.C. § 1414(b)(6)(B) (2017); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)–(c) (2017). 
55 Technically, attorneys’ fees are not a remedy.  Awards of Attorney’s Fees by 
Federal Courts and Federal Agencies, CONG. RES. SERV. 1, 1 (Oct. 22, 2009), 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20091022_94-
970_5ca462bf2eacfb4f483fcf98bd90d9e7313257af.pdf.  However, the IDEA’s fee 
shifting provisions are essential to effective litigation, especially but not at all 
exclusively for poor parents and for students in states with limited availability of 
specialized counsel.  E.g., Debra Chopp, School Districts and Families Under the 
IDEA: Collaborative in Theory, Adversarial in Fact, 32 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. 
JUDICIARY 423, 451–54 (2012) (pointing out the significant role and expense of 
attorneys in the IDEA context); NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BACK TO SCH. ON 
CIVIL RIGHTS (2000), http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2000/Jan252000 (proposing 
publicly funded IDEA attorneys). 
56 E.g., Burnett v. San Mateo Foster City Sch. Dist., 739 F. App’x 870, 872 (9th 
Cir. 2018); T.B. v. Prince George’s Cty. Bd. of Educ., 897 F.3d 566, 578 (4th Cir. 
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1307 (2019); Durbrow v. Cobb Cty. Sch. Dist., 887 
F.3d 1182, 1196 (11th Cir. 2018); D.G. v. Flour Bluff Indep. Sch. Dist., 481 F. 
App’x 887, 893 (5th Cir. 2012); D.S. ex rel. Z.S. v. Neptune Twp. Bd. of Educ., 
264 F. App’x 186, 189–90 (3d Cir. 2008); T.W. ex rel. K.J. v. Leander Indep. Sch. 
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various cases where the district has reasonable suspicion of the child’s 
eligibility and does not conduct a timely evaluation,57 but the parents 
fail to prove that the child was eligible.58  Both of these contingencies 
present significant problems in ultimately adjudicating eligibility.  The 
first challenge is based on changes in the child during the interim that 
may affect eligibility,59 particularly because the hearing process and 
judicial appeals prolong the interim period from six months to two-
years.60  The second contingency increases the possibility of eligibility 
changes due to the time-consuming process of IDEA adjudication.61  It 
also can serve as an incentive reinforcing districts’ failure to fulfill their 
evaluation obligation, for the following reasons in addition to the usual 
parental difficulties of litigating against their school district.62  Under 
                                                     
Dist., 74 IDELR ¶ 12 (W.D. Tex. 2019); D.F. ex rel. Evans v. Sacramento Unified 
Sch. Dist., 63 IDELR ¶ 164 (E.D. Cal. 2014); cf. J.G. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 
2014 WL 12576617 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2014); E.M. ex rel. E.M. v. Pajaro 
Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 41 (N.D. Cal. 2008), rev'd in part on other 
grounds, 652 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2011) (default rationale).  Indeed, in some cases 
even if the child was eligible, the child find violation has resulted in no remedy.  
E.g., J.N. v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist., 75 IDELR ¶ 153 (N.D. Ala. 2019) (parent did 
not provide preponderant proof that the erroneous finding of ineligibility amounted 
to a denial of FAPE in light of the general intervention services that led to the child 
find violation).  
57 For the successive reasonable suspicion and reasonable period, timely 
evaluation, or dimensions of child find, see supra note 53. 
58 Although most of these cases are in the wake of an untimely evaluation, 
others arise after the lack of a district eligibility evaluation.  E.g., T.W. ex rel. K.J. 
v. Leander Indep. Sch. Dist., 74 IDELR ¶ 12 (W.D. Tex. 2019). 
59 Cf. D.K. ex rel. Stephen K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 251 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (“The mere fact that a subsequent evaluation of [the child] yielded a 
different result—i.e., he was found [eligible] in November 2007 but did not qualify 
in April 2006—does not necessarily render the earlier testing inadequate”). 
60 First, the filing for the hearing may be for up to two years after the parents 
have reason to know of the child find violation.  E.g., G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. 
Auth., 802 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 2015) (applying the IDEA statute of limitations to a 
child find claim).  Second, the majority of impartial hearings are not adjudicated 
within the seventy-five day timeline of the IDEA regulations, which allow for 
extensions upon the request of either party.  E.g., CADRE, Dispute Resolution 
Summary for U.S. and Outlying Areas 2008–09 to 2017–18, 
https://www.cadreworks.org/sites/default/files/resources/2017-
18%20DR%20Data%20Summary%20-%20U.S.%20and%20Outlying%20Areas.pd
f (last visited Feb. 19, 2020) (reporting that 27% of hearings were adjudicated 
within the regulatory timeline for 2017 to 2018).  Third, for the hearing officer 
decisions that are appealed, the period until the final decision often extends to 
subsequent grades in the student’s school career.  E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Autism 
Litigation under the IDEA, 24 J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 92, 94 (2011) (finding 
average of 2.8 years from time of filing for hearing until final court decision for a 
seventeen-year sample of autism cases). 
61 See supra notes 59–60.  
62 In general education, to litigate on behalf of their child against the child’s 
school, parents face daunting problems that are not only economic in terms of 
access to and affordability of sufficiently specialized attorneys, but also emotional 
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the IDEA, (1) parents shoulder the burden of persuasion at due process 
hearings63 with the exception of the few jurisdictions where state law 
provides otherwise, 64  and (2) even if they prevail, parents are not 
entitled to expert witness fees.65 
Yet since the latest IDEA amendments, courts have maintained the 
substantive standard of FAPE, which is more generally the basis of the 
eviscerating effect of step two, at a district friendly level without 
dramatic change despite three successive developments.66  The first 
two were the general purpose and peer-reviewed research (PRR) 
provisions of the 2004 amendments of the IDEA,67 which made no 
significant difference in lower court outcomes despite notable 
advocacy in scholarly commentary.68  More recently and dramatically, 
the Supreme Court’s Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District RE-
                                                     
in terms of the adversarial participation in and consequences of the adjudicative 
process.  These general problems are all the more difficult for parents of children in 
special education in relation to attorney specialization and student vulnerability.  
See Kristen Taketa, Families Endure Costly Legal Fights Trying to Get the Right 
Special Education Services, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2019), 
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-10-06/legal-fights-families-special-
education-services.  
63 Schaffer ex rel. Schaeffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005) (ruling that the 
burden of persuasion in an impartial hearing under the IDEA is on the challenging 
party, i.e., the one seeking relief).  In procedural violation cases, the challenging 
party is the parent.  See id.  
64 Only a handful of state laws —Delaware, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, 
with Connecticut leaving the matter to the discretion of the hearing officer—place 
the burden of persuasion on the school district.  Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws for Due 
Process Hearings under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 38 J. 
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 3, 31 n.93 (2018).  Moreover, the Supreme 
Court left open the question of whether its ruling preempts the aforementioned state 
laws that provide otherwise.  Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 61–62. 
65 Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 292 
(2006). 
66 See Endrew F. ex rel. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 
988, 997 (2017); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206–07. 
67 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d) (2017) (emphasizing, inter alia, “educational results”) 
and 1414(d)(1)(A)(III) (2017) (requiring the IEP provisions for special education 
and related services to be “based on peer-reviewed research to the extent 
practicable”). 
68 E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Have the Amendments to the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act Razed Rowley and Raised the Substantive Standard for 
“Free Appropriate Public Education”?, 28 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 
396 (2008) (tracing commentators’ proposals and the courts’ interpretation of the 
purpose and PRR provisions of IDEA 2004).  Although the relevant judicial 
interpretations of the purpose language ended in the first few years after the 2004 
amendments, the continuing line of cases interpreting PRR have remained in the 
districts’ favor.  E.g., Albright v. Mountain Home Sch. Dist., 926 F.3d 942 (8th Cir. 
2019); E.M. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 763 F. App’x 361 (5th Cir. 2019); 
Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2012); Joshua A. v. Rocklin 
Unified Sch. Dist., 319 F. App’x 692 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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169 revisited and refined the substantive prong in Rowley.70  Yet the 
reformulation of “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make 
progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances”71 has not 
significantly changed the judicial outcomes in the many subsequent 
lower court cases.72 
 
D. Alternate Forum Interpretation 
 
This two-step approach, which reduces procedural violations 
largely to technical and unenforced issues in the adjudicative arena, is 
in clear contrast with the prevailing approach in the alternative 
decisional dispute resolution avenue under the IDEA.73  In most states, 
the complaint procedures avenue, which is an investigative rather than 
adjudicative process, takes a strict one-step approach. 74   Thus, in 
comparison to the adjudicative arena, this forum meaningfully enforces 
compliance with the procedural requirements of the IDEA.  
 
III.  THE REMEDIAL SOLUTION 
 
Although hearing officers, review officers, and courts have almost 
entirely ignored the solution to their effective evisceration of the 
procedural requirements of the Act, it is explicitly in tandem with the 
codification of the two-step test. 75   Specifically, the same 
                                                     
69 Endrew F. ex rel. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 991–93.  
70 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07. 
71 Endrew F. ex rel. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999–1001. 
72 Perry A. Zirkel, The Aftermath of Endrew F.: An Outcomes Analysis Two 
Years Later, 363 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 4 (2019) (finding that only five of the seventy-
five judicial applications of the new substantive standard under Endrew F. resulted 
in a change from a ruling in favor of the district to a ruling in favor of the parent). 
73 See Perry A. Zirkel, The Complaint Procedures Avenue of the IDEA: Has the 
Road Less Traveled By Made All The Difference?, 30 J. OF SPECIAL EDUC. & 
LEADERSHIP 88, 88 (2017).  
74 E.g., An Empirical Comparison, supra note 12, at 183 (finding that parents’ 
success rate was twice as high for procedural FAPE claims in the complaints 
procedures than the impartial hearing venue, with even more dramatic disparities in 
the success rate for child find, evaluation, notice, and discipline claims). 
75 Romberg proposed a much more theoretical structural approach based on the 
principles of contracts, collaboration, and individualization and that meshed with 
the three subparts of the aforementioned.  Romberg, supra note 31, at 449–66; 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii) (2017).  However, his approach ignored the 
accompanying statutory solution and the remedy of prospective procedural 
correction.  Infra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. Moreover, his approach has 
not gained any judicial traction, with citations limited to the peripheral use of 
distinguishing between procedural and substantive FAPE.  R.S. ex rel. Soltes v. Bd. 
of Dir. of Woods Charter Sch. Co., 73 IDELR ¶ 252 (M.D.N.C. 2019); Beckwith v. 
District of Columbia, 208 F. Supp. 3d 34, 45 (D.D.C. 2016); J.T. ex rel. A.T. v. 
Dumont, 58 IDELR ¶ 229 (D.N.J. 2012) (referring to the two-step approach for 
procedural FAPE).  
     Safeguarding Procedures Under the IDEA 
 
13Spring 2020  
 
aforementioned76 codification of the two-step test ends its elucidation 
of step two with the following caveat: “Nothing in this subparagraph 
shall be construed to preclude a hearing officer from ordering a local 
educational agency to comply with procedural requirements under this 
section.”77 
Thus, in light of their broad equitable authority under the IDEA,78 
hearing officers could and should issue prospective injunctive relief to 
rectify the procedural violation or violations.  Such relief may include, 
for example, ordering the revision of pertinent policies or procedures, 
training the child’s violating staff members, or a corrective procedural 
redo.79  The two relevant subsets of child find cases80 serve as effective 
examples.  Under this statutorily authorized solution, those child find 
cases lacking any evaluation should typically result in an order for an 
evaluation. 81   Those with delayed but defensible determination of 
ineligibility could result in an order for child find training for the 
violating staff members or for a revision in the district’s child find 
procedures.82  The general purpose, as any equitable relief, is to be 
justly tailored to the scope and nature of the violation.83  The more 
specific purpose in these cases is to restore the procedural dimension 
of the Act to a more balanced and effective position aligned with the 
statute’s overall structure84 and specific language.85 
                                                     
76 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii) (2017). 
77 Id.  Recently, the administering agency for the IDEA added indirect support 
via this guidance: “The SEA, pursuant to its general supervisory responsibility . . . 
must ensure that a hearing officer's decision is implemented in a timely manner, 
unless either party appeals the decision.  This is true even if the hearing officer's 
decision includes only actions to ensure procedural violations do not recur and no 
child-specific action is ordered.”  Letter to Zirkel, 74 IDELR ¶ 171 (OSEP 2019). 
78 Letter to Kohn, 17 IDELR 522 (OSEP 1991) (“based upon the facts and 
circumstances of each individual case, an impartial hearing officer has the authority 
to grant any relief he/she deems necessary”); see generally Perry A. Zirkel, The 
Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review Officers under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act: The Latest Update, 37 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. 
JUDICIARY 505 (2018).  The exception is for the awarding of attorneys’ fees.  Id. at 
555–56. 
79 Id. at 536–54.  The alternatives of policy or training orders must be equitably 
specific to the scope of the case.  E.g., J.N. ex rel. M.N. v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of 
Educ., 75 IDELR ¶ 153 (N.D. Ala. 2019) (denying requested district-wide training 
order in the absence of evidence of systemic child-find violations). 
80 Supra note 58. 
81 E.g., Student with a Disability, 63 IDELR ¶ 205 (Utah SEA 2014). 
82 E.g., District of Columbia Pub. Sch.,120 LRP 184 (D.C. SEA 2019).   
83 E.g., Branham v. District of Columbia, 427 F.3d 7, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(emphasizing the need for an inquiry that is “above all, tailored to the unique needs 
of the disabled student”).   
84 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205–06. 
85 Supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
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To date, the use of this corrective remedial authority has been 
relatively rare and largely limited to the hearing officer level.86  The 
even more limited judicial authority supports this approach.  For 
example, in Dawn G. v. Mabank Independent School District87 the 
court rejected the school district’s contention that the hearing officer’s 
prospective procedural remedies were ultra vires after ruling that the 
district met the substantive standard for FAPE.88  Observing that the 
hearing officer did not comply with some procedural requirements, the 
court cited the aforementioned 89  IDEA provision in upholding the 
hearing officer’s orders.90   
Other examples do not cite the statutory solution, but provide at 
least secondary support in the child find context.  First, presenting a 
mixed example, another federal court upheld a hearing officer’s order 
for a new evaluation as a result of a child find violation.91  The district 
appealed, contending that its child find violation amounted to harmless 
error due to its determination that the child was not eligible.92  The 
court rejected this claim for mixed reasons.93  In part, the substantive 
loss to the student remained in question because, in agreeing with the 
hearing officer that the district’s evaluation was not sufficiently 
comprehensive, the court reasoned that the result “may mean” that the 
child was eligible.94  However, in an overlapping part, the child find 
                                                     
86 E.g., Phila. Sch. Dist., 118 LRP 19611 (Pa. SEA Feb. 9, 2018) (finding no 
substantial denial of FAPE but ordering correction of procedural defects of IEP); 
Boston Pub. Sch., 69 IDELR ¶ 25 (Mass. SEA 2016) (finding de minimis denial of 
FAPE to date but ordering specified completion of evaluation and contingent IEP 
team consideration of compensatory education); Red Lion Area Sch. Dist., 115 LRP 
12726 (Pa. SEA Mar. 9, 2015) (finding no substantive denial of FAPE but issuing 
various orders to correct procedural violations); Mabank Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 LRP 
2115 (Tex. SEA Sept. 12, 2012); D.C. Pub. Sch., 111 LRP 20046 (D.C. SEA Aug. 
20, 2010) (finding no substantial denial of FAPE but ordering district to issue prior 
written notice to parent); cf. District of Columbia, 117 LRP 21233 (D.C. SEA 
2017); Highlands Cty. Sch. Bd., 115 LRP 27365 (Fla. SEA 2015); Walker Cty. Bd. 
of Educ., 111 LRP 48174 (Ala. SEA 2011); Student with a Disability, 109 LRP 
17648 (Va. SEA 2008a); Fulton Cty. Sch. Dist., 49 IDELR ¶ 30 (Ga. SEA 2007) 
(ordering a new manifestation determination as a result of procedural violations in 
the first manifestation determination). 
87 Dawn G. ex rel. D.B. v. Mabank Indep. Sch. Dist., 63 IDELR ¶ 63 (N.D. 
Tex. 2014). 
88 Dawn G. ex rel. D.B., 63 IDELR ¶ 63 (N.D. Tex. 2014). 
89 Supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
90 Dawn G. ex rel. D.B., 63 IDELR ¶ 63 (N.D. Tex. 2014). 
91 Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 413 v. H.M.J. ex rel. A.J., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1108 
(D. Minn. 2019).  
92 Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 413, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 1111.  
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 1111; cf. Hoover City Bd. of Educ. v. Leventry ex rel. K.M., 75 IDELR 
¶ 32 (N.D. Ala. 2019); Wimbish v. D.C., 381 F. Supp. 3d 22, 36–38 (D.D.C. 2019) 
(illustrating remedy of an order for evaluation in the context of an eligibility 
determination was open to question in light of a defective evaluation). 
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violation resulted in deprivation of meaningful parental participation.95  
In the second example, the Alaska Supreme Court addressed a child 
find violation in the unusual situation in which the district found the 
child ineligible, but the parents withdrew this issue from the appeal.96  
The court reasoned that “a school district’s duty to [timely] evaluate 
children for eligibility under the IDEA is not dependent upon the 
ultimate determination that the child is ‘disabled.’”97  Based on this 
reasoning, the court upheld the hearing officer’s order for 
reimbursement of the independent educational evaluation (IEE). 98  
However, limiting the remedy in the absence of a substantive denial of 
FAPE, the court reversed the hearing officer’s other reimbursement 
order, which was for the private tutoring expenses that the parents had 
incurred.99 
A final, more peripheral example arose within the specialized 
context of the IDEA’s requirement for a manifestation determination 
upon a disciplinary change in placement.100  A federal district court in 
Pennsylvania upheld a hearing officer’s order to conduct another 
manifestation determination review based on “significant procedural 
flaws” in its first review.101 
This proposed approach has the added advantage of closing the gap 
between the hearing officer and complaint procedures avenues of 
decisional dispute resolution,102 thus mitigating forum shopping and 
                                                     
95 Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 413, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 1112.  Whether this parental 
prong argument applies more generally in response to child find harmless error 
cases depends at least in part as to whether the underlying rationale is lack of 
eligibility generally or lack of FAPE specifically.  Id.  In any event, the proposed 
solution of a prospective procedural remedy tailored to the violation remains 
applicable to the cases otherwise lacking any remedy at all.  Id. 
96 J.P. ex rel. P.P. v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 260 P.3d 285, 286 (Alaska 2011). 
97 Id. at 293. 
98 Although in comparison to most cases of IEEs at public expense, this 
prospective remedy is unusual, the court pointed to the “unique circumstances” of 
the case, specifically the district’s use of the parents’ IEE “and the inadequacy of 
alternative remedies.”  Id. at 294–95.   
99 Id. at 292–93.   
100 Supra note 48. 
101 Bristol Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Z.B. ex rel. K.B., 67 IDELR ¶ 9 (E.D. Pa. 2016).  
However, this case is only partially supportive due to the fuzzy boundary between 
procedural and substantive violations, as evidenced in the tandem order for 
compensatory education.  Id. 
102 The reason for the disparity is the prevailing one-step approach to 
procedural FAPE in the complaint procedures forum.  Supra note 74 and 
accompanying text.  Interestingly, in the pertinent provision of the IDEA Congress 
noted the interconnection of the two decision dispute resolution avenues with regard 
to procedural issues.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(F) (2017) (clarifying that the prescribed 
adjudicatory treatment of procedural FAPE does not affect the complaint 
procedures alternative).  Another potential gap-closing activity is whatever extent 
that state education agencies implement the OSEP guidance to enforce technical, or 
step one only violations identified in either complaint procedures or due process 
hearing decisions.  E.g., Letter to Copenhaver, 53 IDELR ¶ 165 (OSEP 2008). 
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deferral issues. 103   It also closes the gap between the procedural 
orientation of state education department compliance supervision104 
and local education professional development. 105   In doing so, it 
provides enforceable meaning to the “elaborate and highly specific 
procedural safeguards” that are the backbone of the Act and for which 
compliance is at least as important as the substantive dimension.106  If 
indeed the legal emphasis instead should be on substantive 
outcomes, 107  Congress should amend the Act accordingly to 
intentionally degrade the procedural dimension.  Unless and until 
Congress evinces such intent, adjudicators should follow the overall 
structure of the Act and fulfill their specific authority for prospective 
procedural remedies.  
This adjudicative approach not only corrects the violation for the 
child, but also triggers the potential for the recovery of attorneys’ fees 
that the parents expended in proving this violation.108  The entitlement 
and the amount of attorneys’ fees are not automatic, with the court 
having discretion within a rather carefully balanced set of criteria in the 
Act. 109   Thus, the relatively limited pertinent case law is divided 
depending on the circumstances.110 
Finally, hearing officers, in light of their pivotal position in the 
IDEA’s adjudicative system,111 are potentially the leaders in moving 
                                                     
103 E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Questionable Initiation of Both Decisional Dispute 
Resolution Processes under the IDEA: Proposed Regulatory Interpretations, 49 J. 
L. & EDUC. 99 (2020) (discussing problems in the agency’s policy interpretations of 
the interconnection of these two decisional avenues).  
104 E.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a), 1415(a) (2017) (specifying compliance 
requirements for state eligibility generally and procedural safeguards specifically). 
105 See generally BARBARA D. BATEMAN & MARY ANN LINDEN, BETTER IEPS: 
HOW TO DEVELOP LEGALLY CORRECT AND EDUCATIONALLY USEFUL PROGRAMS  
(2012); BARBARA D. BATEMAN & CYNTHIA M. HERR, WRITING MEASURABLE IEP 
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES  (2006) (illustrating prevailing emphasis on adhering to the 
procedural specifications of the IDEA for IEP content and process). 
106 See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205–06. 
107 E.g., Elevating the Standard for FAPE, supra note 27 (advocating statutory 
raising of the substantive standard in response to the corresponding erosion of the 
procedural dimension). 
108 Given the significant role and expense of attorneys’ fees under the IDEA 
(supra note 55), this added factor adds to the balance-restoring nature of the 
proposed solution by reinforcing the districts’ incentive for procedural compliance 
and the parents’ sense of vindicating utility rather than frustrating futility.   
109 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(i)(3) (2017). 
110 Compare Sykes v. D.C., 870 F. Supp. 2d 86, 91–92 (D.D.C. 2012) 
(awarding attorneys’ fees), with Dawn G. ex rel. D.B. v. Mabank Indep. Sch. Dist., 
63 IDELR ¶ 63 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (declining to award attorneys’ fees).  For a court 
that awarded partial attorneys’ fees within a more comprehensive consideration of 
the equitable relief based on the particular circumstances, including the relief that 
the parents’ sought, see M.A. v. Torrington Bd. of Educ., 980 F. Supp. 2d 245 (D. 
Conn. 2013), further proceedings, 980 F. Supp. 2d 279 (D. Conn. 2014). 
111 Supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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the case law in this restorative, rebalancing direction.112  Primarily113 
because this proposal represents a change in their modus operandi at 
the remedial stage,114 they are likely to be resistant to implement it.115  
Some may indirectly blame the parent, pointing to the requirement for 
the filing party to specify the requested remedy in the complaint.116  
However, the counterbalancing considerations are: (1) this requirement 
is conditional,117 meaning the parent likely did not know it was an 
available remedy;118 (2) “the IDEA does not necessarily limit the relief 
a due process hearing officer can award to the relief a party proposes 
at a given stage of the administrative process[;]”119 and (3) a formulaic 
catch-all 120  consistent with the hearing officer’s remedial authority 
would seem to be a superfluous solution.121  Consequently, the cost-
                                                     
112 Interestingly, the procedural-substantive distinction may also affect the 
degree of deference due for hearing officer decisions.  E.g., Daniel W. Morton-
Bentley, The Rowley Enigma: How Much Weight Is Due to IDEA Administrative 
Proceedings in Federal Court?, 36 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 428, 462-
67 (2016) (proposing judicial deference to substantive, not procedural, findings of 
hearing officers). 
113 An overlapping contributing factor is the tight regulatory timeline for 
completion of the process via issuance of a written decision for both regular and 
expedited hearings.  34 C.F.R. § 300.515(c) (2018); 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(c) (2018).  
In my many years of experience as an IDEA review officer and as an IDEA hearing 
officer trainer, I have found that the remedies stage of decision writing is often 
given insufficient equitable care and creativity due to exhaustion in and of this 
prescribed process. 
114 Not only do hearing officers typically provide no remedy for procedural 
violations that do not survive step two, but also more generally they only rarely 
order purely prospective procedural relief.  Supra note 86 and accompanying text; 
e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Adjudicative Remedies for Denials of FAPE, 33 J. NAT’L 
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 214 (2013) (Adjudicative Remedies for Denials of 
FAPE) (finding that only 5% of 224 hearing officer cases that granted remedies in 
FAPE cases was  an order for evaluation or another action beyond the substantive 
content of the IEP). 
115 Adjudicative Remedies for Denials of FAPE, supra note 114.  
116 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(b)(6) (2018) (requiring the complaint to contain “the 
proposed resolution of the problem to the extent known and available at the time”). 
117 Id. 
118 The likely lack of the requisite knowledge of this remedy is not at all limited 
to pro se parents.  Specialized legal counsel is lacking in many locations.  E.g., Kay 
Hennessey Seven & Perry A. Zirkel, In the Matter of Arons: Construction of the 
IDEA's Lay Advocate Provision Too Narrow?, 9 GEORGETOWN J. POVERTY L. & 
POL’Y 193, 217–19 (2002) (finding notable insufficiency of parent attorneys in 
national survey).   
119 E.g., Albuquerque Pub. Sch. v. Sledge, 74 IDELR ¶ 290 (D.N.M. 2019). 
120 E.g., Dawn G. ex rel. D.B., 63 IDELR ¶ 63 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (reciting 
parent’s culminating request for “any [other] relief that the Hearing Officer . . . 
deem[] appropriate”).  
121 E.g., Letter to Kohn, 17 IDELR 522 (OSEP 1991) (stating the agency’s 
position that “an impartial hearing officer has the authority to grant any relief he 
[or] she deems necessary”).  This authority is derived from the reviewing court’s 
express and broad equitable authority to “grant such relief as the court determines is 
appropriate.”  20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1)(C) (2017).  
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benefit balance weighs in favor of hearing officers’ actively fulfilling 
their broad remedial authority to restore the meaning of the procedural 
dimension of the IDEA to an equitably enforced level.    
